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Abstract—Near Field Communication (NFC)-based mobile
phone services offer a lifeline to the under-appreciated multi-
application smart card initiative. The initiative could effectively
replace heavy wallets full of smart cards for mundane tasks.
However, the issue of the deployment model still lingers on.
Possible approaches include, but are not restricted to, the User
Centric Smart card Ownership Model (UCOM), GlobalPlatform
Consumer Centric Model, and Trusted Service Manager (TSM).
In addition, multiapplication smart card architecture can be a
GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) and/or
User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD), which provide
cross-device security and privacy preservation platforms to their
users. In the multiapplication smart card environment, there
might not be a prior off-card trusted relationship between a
smart card and an application provider. Therefore, as a possible
solution to overcome the absence of prior trusted relationships,
this paper proposes the concept of Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) for smart cards (embedded devices) that can act as a
point of reference for establishing the necessary trust between
the device and an application provider, and among applications.
Keywords-Smart Card, Near Field Communication, Trusted
Execution Environment, GlobalPlatform Consumer Centric
Model, Trusted Platform Module, User Centric Smart Cards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The multi-application smart card initiative has gained mo-
mentum due to the introduction of Near Field Communica-
tion (NFC) [1]. NFC enables a mobile phone to emulate a
contactless smart card [2, 3]. Applications installed on the
secure element1 [4] of an NFC-enabled mobile phone could
utilise this functionality to communicate with external entities
through the contactless interface [5]. Hereafter, the terms
“smart card” and “secure element” are used interchangeably.
NFC field trials are either adopting the traditional card
issuer centric approach, termed the Issuer Centric Smart Card
Ownership Model (ICOM) or a refined form of it known as
Trusted Service Manager (TSM) [6]. In these trials, different
stakeholders are trying to leverage this new technology in their
favour [5, 7]–[9]. In addition, there is a debate around the issue
that ICOM has already decelerated the multiapplication smart
card initiative [10], and why should this model be tried again.
1Secure Element: A secure electronic device that can store data and execute
programmes. Examples include Universal Integrated Circuit Cards (UICC),
Embedded Secure Elements and Secure Memory Cards.
There are some positive points for using the ICOM as it has
proven security, operational and service architecture.
Along with the ICOM, several other smart card owner-
ship models are proposed that include User Centric Smart
Card Ownership Model (UCOM) [10] and the GlobalPlatform
Consumer-Centric Model [11]. In addition, multiapplication
smart card technology can be scaled up to provide a general
purpose security and privacy preservation platform in different
computing environments (i.e. mobiles, tablets, and personal
computers). Examples of such initiatives are the GlobalPlat-
form Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [12] and User
Centric Tamper-Resistant Device (UCTD) [13].
Multiapplication smart cards, under any proposal, will have
applications from diverse application providers. In addition,
smart cards might install applications over the internet. In such
an environment:
1) How is the application provider going to establish trust
in the smart cards?
2) How can the applications installed on the smart card trust
each other?
3) How can the smart card platform verify the state of the
application at installation and during its execution?
This paper will look at the mechanisms to remotely establish
trust in a smart card platform and applications. In addition,
it will examine how a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-based
architecture can fill the gaps and provide a service that answers
the questions above.
A. Structure of the Paper
Section II, discusses the concept of the Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) for smart cards. The discussion of need-of-trust
in the future multiapplication smart card based technologies
is extended in section III and the architecture of the proposed
TCB for smart cards is also addressed. Finally, future research
directions and conclusions are presented in section IV.
II. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE FOR SMART CARDS
This section discusses the motivation behind proposing a
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) for smart cards and how it
fits into the overall smart card services architecture.
A. Motivation
The notions of trust and trustworthiness are fundamental
to the field of computer security, but the definitions are
ambiguous. Trust and trustworthiness mean different things
in different computing environments and in different contexts
(e.g. patient records, consumer devices and online banking).
Therefore, in the context of this paper they are defined by
paraphrasing the definition of trusted computing from [14,
15]. The term “trusted” refers to the level of assurance and
validity that an entity has regarding the security and oper-
ational reliability of a multiapplication smart card (i.e. both
software and hardware). The term “trustworthy” means the
assurance gained by the entity after using specified verification
mechanisms which ensure that the smart card behaves in a
similar fashion to that stated in the provided assurance (i.e.
Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level [16]).
In the ICOM, trust is established based on ownership. As
smart cards are owned by their respective card issuers, so
they would define and enforce the security and functional
policies of the final product. The respective smart card man-
ufacturers would build the product to match the card issuer’s
requirements. If required, as in the case of banking cards, the
card manufacturer will have their smart cards certified by an
independent evaluation authority like Common Criteria (CC)
[16]. The evaluation of the smart cards establishes trust in the
product. After evaluation of the smart cards, generally there is
no implemented mechanism that validates whether their state
is as it was at the time of evaluation.
From the application provider’s point of view, in the ICOM
they have to trust the card issuer, which implicitly establishes
a trust in respective smart cards. Similar arguments can also be
applied in reverse; a card issuer trusts an application because
of the off-card relationship with the application provider. In
such a closed environment with a fixed number of applications
on the smart card, the notion of trust and its dynamic validation
might not be necessary.
The GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric Model (GP-CCM)
and the UCOM both push for the empowerment of the smart
card user. A card user (cardholder) may have the privilege of
deciding which applications (s)he wants to install or delete.
The term “control” in the UCOM and GP-CCM context
means the freedom of “choice” given to cardholders to install
or delete any application from their smart cards without
any restriction from the card manufacturers, card issuers or
TSM. The card issuers and/or application providers are not
required to provide a smart card to their customers. Instead,
they develop their application and make it available to their
authorised user. The application can be downloaded to those
smart cards that abide by the terms and conditions of the
application providers. In the UCOM, the application provider
is referred as a Service Provider (SP). An SP defines an
Application Lease Policy (ALP) [17] that governs the lease of
its applications to authorised customers. The ALP stipulates
the security and operational requirements of an application
and the host smart card platform has to ensure that it provides
adequate functionality to meet these requirements [18].
A smart card is acquired by cardholders directly from a
card provider, which can be a card manufacturer, an SP or a
third party. SPs of the respective applications installed by a
cardholder might not have any off-card/prior trust relationship
with the respective card provider. Therefore, unlike the ICOM,
neither smart cards nor applications have a chain of trust
through their issuing authorities and owners, respectively.
When a cardholder requests installation of an application from
its SP, the SP would like to have a dynamic assurance, which
gives it the trustworthiness of the host platform, and vice
versa [18]. To establish and evaluate the trustworthiness of
a platform or an application requires a trust base. To provide
a trusted base for the UCOM and GP-CCM initiative, this
paper proposes a trusted entity on the smart card, known as the
Trusted Execution and Environment Manager (TEM). Such an
entity would play a crucial role in establishing the trustworthi-
ness of smart cards [18], platform assurance [19], smart card
firewall mechanisms [20], trusted execution environments and
smart card content backup/restoration mechanisms [21]. From
the point of view of different stake-holders in various smart
card models, a TEM should be able to provide, at a minimum,
the following services.
1) Confidence in Current State: Provide assurance and val-
idation that the state of a smart card (software and
hardware) is as secure as it was at the time of CC
evaluation.
2) Trust in the Downloaded Application: Ensure that the
application is downloaded and personalised in a secure
and reliable fashion. Provide proof to the appropriate SP
that there was no modification of the application during
the download and installation process.
3) Secure State and Application Sharing: Provide assurance
and validation services which an application can use to
validate its current state, and verify the state of other ap-
plication(s) with which it establishes application sharing.
4) Secure Execution: Provide a trusted execution environ-
ment which ensures that an application is executed in a
trusted and secure environment.
5) Simulator Detection: Provide verification and validation
mechanisms to ascertain both the existence of a smart
card and that the item is not a smart card simulator
(hardware genuineness [22]).
B. Related Work
At the time of writing, there appears to be no related work
that discusses the need for or design of a TCB for smart cards.
Nevertheless, the TPM architecture for embedded devices was
proposed by Araja et al. in [23]. Kurt et al. discussed the
possibility of using smart cards as TPMs for mobile phones
[24], based on their earlier work in which they proposed an
architecture to implement the Mobile Trusted Module (MTM)
on Java Card [25]. Furthermore, smart cards are used with
TPMs to provide a secure and reliable architecture [26]. In
relation to NFC, TPM and MTM have been proposed by [27,
28]. In the literature there are countless examples of using
smart cards in relation to TPMs and the above-mentioned
architectures are by no means an exhaustive list, or the best
possible material.
III. TRUSTED ENVIRONMENT & EXECUTION MANAGER
(TEM)
This section discusses the architecture of a TEM specific
for smart cards, and highlights how the TEM differs from a
typical TPM not only in architectural but also in operational
context.
A. Architecture
The overall architecture of a UCOM based smart card is
illustrated in Figure 1. The TEM is illustrated as a layer
between the smart card hardware and the runtime environment.
This illustration provides a semantic view of the architecture
and does not imply that all communication between the
runtime environment and the hardware goes through the TEM.
Smart Card Runtime Environment (SCRT)
Smart Card Firewall
Platform Space Application Space
Native Code
Smart Card Hardware
Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM)
Figure 1. Smart Card Architecture in with TEM
If general TPM requirements are analysed [15], the basic
building blocks in the hardware required to build a TPM chip
are already available on smart cards. Therefore, most of the
functionality of the TEM would be implemented in software
and it would not impose any additional hardware requirement
on the host platform. The detailed TEM architecture is shown
in Figure 2.
Figure 2 depicts native code and smart card hardware as
complementary components of the TEM. This is because the
TEM does not need separate hardware for its operations. It
will utilise the existing services provided by the smart card
hardware. To avoid duplicating the code, the TEM uses the
native code implementation of cryptographic services like
encryption/decryption, digital signature and random number
generation.
1) Interface: The interface manages communication with
external entities that can either be on-card or off-card entities.
Any request that the interface receives is interpreted: if it is
a well-formed request and the requesting entity is authorised
to do so, then the interface will redirect the request to the
intended module in the TEM. The interface during the interpre-
tation of the request will enforce the access policy of the TEM
as defined by the access control module (discussed in section
III-A3). To manage these relationships with the authorised
entities, the TEM should have a mechanism to establish
the relationship in the first place. Therefore, at the time of
installation of an application, a binding (symmetric key) is
generated between the downloaded application and the TEM.
For all subsequent communications, the application would use
this key when requesting the TEM [29]. The protocol that
establishes this binding is managed by the interface and the
binding is stored in the key/certificate manager (section III-A4)
and corresponding access privilege in access control module.
2) Attestation Handler: During the application installation
process, both an application and a smart card platform would
need to verify each other’s current state to gain assurance
of their trustworthiness. An application can only request
attestation for either itself or the respective platform. It cannot
request attestation for other applications on the smart card
concerned. However, to facilitate the application sharing mech-
anism [20] an application can issue an authorisation token.
The attestation handler will then provide the attestation of the
token-issuing application to the requesting application [30].
3) Access Control: At the time of application installation,
the SP involved would request attestation of the card platform.
However, no information regarding any of the other applica-
tions installed on the card would be provided to the SP at
this stage. Once the application is installed, it can request
attestation only for itself and not for any other applications.
These restrictions are required to avoid privacy issues like
application scanning attacks [30].
4) Key & Certificate Manager: The key & certificate man-
ager manages the keys and certificates that a TEM stores in the
non-volatile memory (EEPROM [32]). Contrary to the general
TPM architecture, there are no migratable keys in the TEM.
The TEM signature key pair and certificate is the permanent
key and certificate (it can be considered as the endorsement
key in the general TPM architecture). Besides managing the
keys and certificates, it also generates them. Therefore, it is
a combination of key generation and non-volatile memory
components of the general TPM.
The key & certificate manager stores the evaluation cer-
tificates which are provided by the respective applications.
Therefore, when an application requests attestation, the TEM
does not return the hash value of the application. In fact, it
returns an evaluation of whether the current state complies
with the state for which the evaluation certificate was issued.
Therefore, the decision whether an application is trustworthy
or not is actually made by the TEM. If the evaluation fails,
then depending upon the application or platform policy it
might either block the application or delete it (and inform
the cardholder and respective SP).
5) Ownership Manager: This component manages the
ownership of a smart card. When a smart card is acquired by
a user either from a card manufacturer or a card supplier, it is
under the default ownership of the card manufacturer/supplier.
The user then initiates the ownership acquisition process
that requires the user to provide personal information (i.e.
name and date of birth) and their Card Management Personal
Identification Number (CM-PIN). The TEM will then generate
a signature key pair specific to the cardholder along with a
certificate that will also include the user information. Although
this key is assigned to the cardholder, it will be protected by
the TEM.
6) TSM Scheme Registration Manager: This module is
optional and it facilitates Competitive Architecture for Smart
Cards. For further details please refer to Akram et al [31].










































Figure 2. Trusted Platform Module for Smart Card Architecture
7) Lease & Contract Manager: An SP would lease its
application to a smart card (cardholder) and the card would
assure that it would abide by the SP’s ALP. The lease contract
is signed by the TEM with the user’s signature key and as these
keys are stored/restrict access only to the TEM, the signing and
storage of the contracts are on the TEM. The cardholder can
retrieve these contracts after providing the CM-PIN if he/she
needs to. Similarly, individual applications can also retrieve
their own contracts from the TEM repository.
8) Backup/Restoration Manager: A cardholder may down-
load multiple applications onto her smart card. If she loses her
smart card, she will lose access to all of the applications (and
related services). One possible approach can be to acquire a
new card and then manually install all the applications again.
However, another approach could be that a user creates a
backup of the installed applications and restores the backup
to a new smart card, if required. This backup mechanism is
credential-based (a token issued by the SPs and not the actual
application) and it is stored securely at a remote location
[21]. When users lose their smart cards, they only need to
get a new smart card and then initiate the restoration process,
which will take each credential from the backup and initiate
the application download process with respective SPs. The
restoration process can also request the respective SPs to
block (revoke the lease) their application(s) installed on the
stolen/lost device.
9) Self-test Manager: For security validation, the TEM
implements a validation mechanism that is divided into two
parts: tamper-evidence and reliability assurance. Smart cards
are required to be tamper-resistant devices [32] and for this
purpose card manufacturers implement hardware-based tamper
protections. The tamper-evidence process verifies whether the
implemented tamper-resistant mechanisms are still in place
and effective. The reliability assurance process, on the other
hand, verifies that the software part of the smart card that is
crucial for its security and reliability has not been tampered
with.
A TEM tamper-evidence process should provide the prop-
erties listed below:
1) Robustness: On input of certain data, it always produces
the associated output.
2) Independence: When the same data is input to a tamper-
evidence process on two different devices, it outputs
different values.
3) Pseudo-randomness: The generated output should be
computationally difficult to distinguish from a pseudo-
random function.
4) Tamper-evidence: An invasive attack to access the func-
tion should cause irreversible changes, which render the
device unusable.
5) Assurance: The function can provide assurance (either
implicitly or explicitly) to independent (non-related) ver-
ifiers. It should not require an active connection with
the device manufacturer to provide the assurance. The
assurance refers to the current hardware and software
state as it was at the time of third party evaluation.
For the TEM tamper-evidence process there are several can-
didates including: active (intelligent) shield/mesh [32]; Known
Answer Test (KAT) [33], hard-wired HMAC key, attestation
based on PRNG [22]; and Physically Unclonable Function
(PUF) [34]. Two algorithms that provide tamper-evidence
and reliability based upon PUF and PRNG based validation
mechanisms are discussed in [35] and [36], respectively.
10) Runtime Security Manager: The purpose of the runtime
security manager is to enforce the security counter-measures
defined by the respective platform. To enforce the security
counter-measures, the runtime security manager has access
to the heap area (e.g. method area, Java stacks) and can be
implemented as either a serial or a parallel mode.
A serial runtime security manager will rely on the execution
engine of the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) [37] to
perform the required tasks. This means that when an execution
engine encounters instructions that require an enforcement
of the security policy, it will invoke the runtime security
manager that will then perform the checks. If successful the
execution engine continues with execution, otherwise, it will
terminate. A parallel runtime security manager will have its
own dedicated hardware (i.e. processor) support that enables it
to perform checks simultaneously while the execution engine
is executing an application. Having multiple processors on a
smart card is technically possible [32]. The main question
regarding the choice is not the hardware, but the balance
between performance and latency. Therefore, theoretically we
can assume that a serial runtime security manager will have
low performance but also a low latency value, while a par-
allel runtime security manager will have a good performance
measure but a higher latency value.
It is obvious that implementation of additional components
like runtime security managers will also incur additional
economic costs (i.e. increase in the price of a UCTD). The
security measures that could be enforced are: 1) Operand Stack
Integrity 2) Control Flow Analysis 3) Bytecode Integrity
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This paper has discussed the importance of having a TCB
on embedded devices like smart cards. The paper discussed
existing smart card architectures and illustrated how they
fall short of a TCB framework, then proposed the TEM
architecture and discussed its different components. Finally,
it described a few of the applications that will benefit from
such an architecture. Future research involves implementing
the TEM as part of the Java Card architecture and doing some
performance and reliability evaluation.
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